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Abstract
We analyze the dynamics of takeover contests where hostile raiders compete
against white knights involved by a lead blockholder of the target firm (the
incumbent). We assume that the incumbent has the power to bargain with the
potential bidders to set a minimum takeover price. We characterize the conditions
under which a white knight wins the takeover contest despite the smaller value
of its synergies as compared to those of the hostile bidder. The paper provides
a new explanation for the reason why we observe so few hostile takeovers in
reality; moreover, it sheds some light on the effectiveness of white knights as an
anti-takeover device and the role played by leading minority blockholders in the
market for corporate control.
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1 Introduction
Since the seminal paper of Manne (1965) changes in corporate control are considered to
be a key mechanism of corporate governance1. However, the effectiveness of the market
for corporate control as a disciplinary device for managerial misbehaviour crucially
relies on the existence of credible hostile takeover threats. In practice, firms have
been endowed over the time with several different anti-takeover measures to protect
themselves against undesired, or sometimes inefficient, hostile takeovers. Among these,
white knight intervention is effectively one of the most common devices particularly in
Europe (Kästle and Trappehl, (2006))2.
In this paper, we study the impact of two possible anti-takeover devices on the
outcome of a takeover contest, namely the intervention of a friendly white knight and
the existence of a dominant blockholder, who has control over the negotiations of the
offers with the bidders. This question is particularly important in the light of the
current debate among academics as well as regulators on how to design anti-takeover
measures in order not to undermine the effectiveness of the market for corporate control.
Additionally, the role of white knights has received a lot of attention from the financial
press in recent years following some high-profile cases3.
We show that the presence of a leading minority shareholder controlling the bar-
gaining process may result in an inefficient allocation of control. More precisely, owing
to the expected loss of his private benefits of control in the event of a takeover by the
hostile bidder, the incumbent turns to be a tougher bargainer with the raider than with
the white knight thereby creating scope even for a white knight with lower synergies
than the raider to win the takeover auction. Furthermore, we show that the threat
itself of an ex-post intervention of a white knight may be sufficient to prevent the raider
from launching an unsolicited bid. Thus our paper provides a possible explanation for
the reason why we observe so few hostile takeovers, particularly in Europe.
Previous papers (Burkart et al. (2000); Harris, (1990)) have shown that the presence
of a leading minority blockholder in the target firm can make the takeover harder. This
because the minority blockholder, anticipating a loss of private benefit of control in the
event of a successful hostile takeover, is typically a tougher bargainer than the other
1This view has been subsequently further strengthened by several other papers e.g. Grossmann and
Hart (1980) and Franks and Meyer (1996). See also Burkart and Panunzi (2008) for an comprehensive
review of the literature on takeover and the market for corporate control.
2The EU Take-over Directive 2004/25/EG for instance has issued guidelines aiming at prohibiting
interference during a take-over. Specifically, the directive suggests to eliminate any prospective defence
and to only allow the search for a white knight. As it is usual for EU Directives, each member state
thas he possibility to opt-out and keep its own current regulation.
3Some recent and well knows examples of hostile takeovers in Europe where a white knight has
been involved by the target include: Arcelor(target-T)/Mittal(raider-R)/Severstal(white knight-WK);
Schering(T)/Merck(R)/Bayer(WK) and BAA(T)/Ferrovial(R)/Goldman Sachs(WK) (see Kästle and
Trapphel (2006)). See also Section 4 for a more detailed discussion on the characteristics of these
takeovers.
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shareholders.
In a recent paper, Aktas et al. (2008) investigate the impact of ex-ante competition
on the bidding strategy of the initial bidder in friendly takeovers. Similarly to our
model, they show that the initial (friendly) bid is affected by the potential competition
of other bidders. However, in their model it is the number of potential competitors in
the subsequent stages that affects the opening bid, whereas we show that the existence
of just one potential, friendly competitor may force an hostile raider to increase the
takeover premium and possibly force him out of the contest. Also, in Aktas et al. (2008)
the competitor with the highest synergy always wins the auction, which is not the case
in our model. Our results then cast a doubt on the ability of the market to allocate
control efficiently when we take into account the contestants’ bidding strategies.
In the literature there is a growing research interest in the specific dynamics of
takeover contests. Eckbo (2008) points out that "in a very real sense, merger nego-
tiations occur in the shadow of an auction, so the expected auction outcome affects
the bargaining power of the negotiation parties." [pag. 3]. And Boone and Mulherin
(2007) stress the importance of understand the role of what they define the "private"
part of a takeover process in order to draw conclusions on the efficiency of the market
for corporate control.
In this paper we present a model where an unsolicited bid is made for a target firm
which is characterized by a leading blockholder (incumbent) that enjoys some private
benefits of control4. The incumbent believes he would lose such control benefits if
the raider takes over the firm, labelling then this first bid as hostile. Consequently
he has an incentive to invoke a friendly bidder to compete against the hostile raider.
At the moment of his opening bid, the raider anticipates that with some probability
he may face a competitor, considered as friendly by the incumbent. We then design
the takeover contest as a particular ascending auction where the bids at each round
result from a bargaining between the leading blockholder and the current bidder. The
idea of modelling the interaction between the leading blockholder and the bidder as a
bargaining process is borrowed and adapted from Harris (1990). However, the innov-
ative contribution of our paper is to combine the bargaining process with an English
auction where the raider and the white knight compete one against the other for the
control of the target company. Using this new framework we are able to characterize
the conditions under which the threat of a white knight intervention at a later stage is
sufficient to prevent a more efficient hostile bid. Furthermore, we derive the conditions
under which the white knight is able to overbid the raider and take control of the target
firm despite her lower synergy.
Finally, the present paper sheds light on the mechanism leading to the determination
of takeover bids, when the target firm has a leading minority blockholder who leads
the takeover negotiation.
Our model identifies several dimensions that play a crucial role in determining the
outcome of the takeover contest and leads to precise empirical predictions. Specifically:
4The leading blockholder can potentially be the target management, as in Harris (1990).
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• The higher the likelihood of a white knight intervention after a hostile bid, the
higher will be the takeover premium offered by the hostile raider;
• The same effect holds for an increase of the incumbent’s private benefits of con-
trol. In general, target shareholders earn in terms of higher takeover premium
whenever the presence of the white knight does not prevent the hostile raider
from launching his first bid;
• The higher the initial hostile bid, the lower the probability to observe a successive
white knight intervention;
• The higher the initial hostile bid, the higher the synergy of a white knight, if she
intervenes; hence, the higher the ex-post performance in case of a success of the
friendly bidder;
• The ex-post performance of the firms merged with a white knight following a high
first hostile bid should be higher than the ex-post performance of firms merged
with a white knight who defeated a very low hostile bid.
The paper is structured as follows: in the next section we spell out the details of the
model and the takeover contest. Section 3 derives the optimal bidding strategies of the
two contestants. In Section 4 we discuss the empirical implications that can be drawn
from our model. Section 5 introduces an extension. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 The model
Consider a model with three risk-neutral agents: a target firm T with a leading minority
blockholder denoted by I and an otherwise dispersed ownership; a hostile raider H;
and a white knight WK. The hostile bidder and the white knight compete for the
control over T . Due to the dispersed ownership structure of firm T, the minority block
β owned by I entitles a real control authority over T to its owner (see for example
Burkhart, Gromb and Panunzi (2000)): hence, the control is transferred to the raider
through a sale of the controlling block β. This assumption can be motivated in several
different ways: we can think that β is effectively a controlling stake (e.g. β is close
to 50 percent of the total amount of shares); or that the bidder cannot shop around
for shares because T is a private equity firm or because it would be more expensive
to buy a controlling stake β from small shareholders due to their free riding behavior
(Grossman and Hart (1980), and Burkart et al. (2000)).
We now spell out the details of the takeover process.
The Firms - The process starts at time t = 0 when all firms values are normalized
to zero. At t = 0 H may offer an unsolicited takeover bid for the incumbent block β of
firm T. The value of each share of T for H is equal to RH which represents the present
value of the future cash flows of the conglomerate originated by the acquisition of T ;
equivalently, RH is equal to the present value of the (private) synergies that H expects
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to gain by acquiring a share of T 5. The synergy RH is commonly known across the
participants.
At the moment of making his first bid the raider H knows that with probability p a
second bidder, WK, possibly invoked by I, may enter the takeover contest in the next
period, i.e. at t = 1, and make a counteroffer. At t = 0, H also knows that the private
valuation (synergy) of a share of firm T for WK, denoted by RWK, is distributed
according to a uniform c.d.f F on the support [0;RH ] and density function f. The
synergy of the white knight can be interpreted as the value of avoiding the negative
externality that a merger between H and T would have on WK.6 If WK steps in at
t = 1, then her valuation will become public across the participants7.
Additionally, we assume that a merger between H and WK is never profitable and
that ex- ante and ex-post side-payments from T to WK are not allowed: this implies
that WK will offer at most RWK for each share of T .
8
The leading blockholder - The leading blockholder (or incumbent) I has a con-
trolling stake β in company T and derives control benefits equal to B9. Note that in
practice the role of leading blockholder could also be played by the target management.
What matters for our purposes is that I is pivotal to the transfer of control whereas
all other shareholders are atomistic. We assume that I loses his private benefits of
control if the the firm is taken over by the hostile raider whereas he will be able to
maintain them in case of a success of the friendly bidder. This may happen because,
for instance, WK will let I continue to manage the company, or she will allow him to
sit in the Board of Directors with strong supervision powers. Due to the free-riding
behavior of atomistic shareholders (Grossman and Hart (1980)), for each bidder is more
convenient to purchase the stake β of the incumbent in order to gain control over the
company than to acquire it from the dispersed shareholders (Burkart et al. (2000)).
Consequently, the bidders will have to negotiate the offer with I at each stage of the
process in the way detailed below.
The bidding process - We denote with bt the publicly known offer of bidder j =
H,WK at time t for a share of T 10. The offer needs to receive the approval of the
5The common value part of the target firm T is normalized to zero and commonly known across
participants.
6This interpretation is consistent with the "pre-emptive" theory of mergers by Fridolfsson and
Stennek (2005).
7This is not a crucial assumption for our results. What matters is that I knows RWK and this
reasonably occurs during the barganing negotiation.
8The rationale for this assumption is that we want to check whether there exist conditions under
which the white knight wins the takeover contest even in the absence of a side payment from the target
management. If this is true, then it will be a fortiori true in the case she receives a side payment from
T ’s management. Examples of such side payments are the supply of raw material at a price below
the market price or the so-called "crown jewels" transferred from T to the taking over firm after the
acquisition. Additionally this is consistent with the current regulation that forbids the target firm
from providing financial support to the white knight. (Kastel and Trapphel, 2006)
9See Burkart et al.(2000) for a rationale of why minority blockholder may be able to extract private
benefits of control.
10Thus, the offer for the entire block β is equal to βbt. From now on, we will reason in terms of offer
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incumbent i.e. it needs to be higher than a minimum threshold at which I will be
willing to tender his shares. This minimum bid is obtained as the Nash bargaining
solution between I and the bidder for the splitting of the synergy Rj.
11
At t = 0, H decides whether to initiate the takeover contest or not: if he does, he
offers bH0 .Then at t = 1 a white knight decides whether to step in and make a counter-
offer which has to be higher than the hostile outstanding bid: bWK1 > b
H
0 . From t = 1
onward, the control contest unfolds as an English auction, i.e. with subsequent bids of
H and WK respectively.
At each round of the game the minimum bid is the result of a Nash bargaining
between I and the current bidder to split the surplus generated by the control transfer.
This surplus is proportional respectively to RH or RWK depending on whom I is
bargaining with. Suppose that at a given time t the outstanding bid is bHt . If I accepts
the offer and tenders his shares he obtains a monetary payoff βbHt but he also loses
his private benefits of control B. If the outstanding bid is a friendly bid bWKt , and I
accepts the white knight’s offer he cashes in βbWKt and also keeps his private benefits
B.
We also need to evaluate the parties’ disagreement payoffs, i.e. the parties’ payoff if
the takeover fails. Intuitively, for the two bidders the disagreement payoffs are simply
their initial values zero. Conversely, for the incumbent the disagreement payoff at each
round is represented by his current outside option, that is the payoff he would get
if he accepted the outstanding bid. More precisely, if I is bargaining with WK and
the outstanding hostile bid is bHt , his outside options is measured by βb
H
t −B, i.e. the
monetary payoff minus the loss of the control benefits. If I is instead bargaining with H
and the friendly outstanding bid is bt+1, then his disagreement payoff would be βb
WK
t+1 ,
i.e. the monetary payoff she would get by selling to WK (there is no loss of control
benefit in this case). Figure 1 summarizes the timeline of the events.
3 The solution of the takeover contest
In this section we describe in details the different stages of the bidding process and
define the optimal bidding strategies of both the hostile bidder and the white knight.
We then derive the conditions under which the white knight wins the auction.
The following preliminary result will be useful in the subsequent analysis:
Lemma 1 If H and/or WK know they win the takeover auction for sure at time
t′ > t offering a price bt′ then they will offer such a price at t. Similarly if H or WK
are sure to lose the auction at time t′ > t given the outstanding bid bt, then they will
pull out from the game at time t.
per share.
11In the context of our model the Nash bargaining solution is consistent with alternative dynamic
bargaining solutions (a proof can be requested to the authors).
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t
1 2
Offer
Hostile bid is prepared
First negotiation: H and I meet
Status quo
I rejects I accepts
WK materializes No WK: H wins
WK is there
WK bid is prepared
Second negotiation: WK and I meet
Offer
WK wins
Figure 1:
Proof: The above statement is quite intuitive in our model where the auction game
does not involve a refinement of the bidder’s information set from one round to another.
After t = 1, when the uncertainty about the existence of a white knight is resolved,
no additional information is produced during the takeover process. Therefore, waiting
a later stage to make an offer will only raise the price the bidder has to pay in order
to win. Similarly, if one of the bidders knows for sure that he will certainly lose the
auction then he will exit the game immediately.12
Given Lemma 1 we can focus on the first two rounds of the game. We construct an
equilibrium in which either WK steps in at t = 1 with a winning bid b̂WK1 or H wins
the takeover contest with a bid b̂H0 at t = 0. We also characterize the conditions under
which the threat of a white knight intervention is sufficient to prevent a hostile bidder
to initiate the takeover.
The game is solved backward starting from the white knight’s bid at t = 1.
3.1 The white knight optimal strategy
In t = 1 the outstanding offer by H is denoted by bH0 and I is willing to sell his stake
β at βbH0 in the absence of a higher bid. Note that, given b
H
0 , only white knights that
can profitably offer more than bH0 enter the game, i.e. only white knights with synergy
RWK ∈ (b
H
0 , RH [.
12This holds true under our assumption of no side payment from MT to WK and given that the
bidders’ utility does not depend on the price paid by the other contestant (see Section 5 for a complete
analysis of this case).
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Then, in t = 1 a Nash bargaining round between I andWK takes place to determine
the minimum acceptable bid for MT. Recall that the disagreement payoff of I is equal
to βbH0 −B, because in case of a takeover by H, the target management will loose his
private benefit B. The disagreement payoff for WK is equal to zero. The total surplus
that can be split between the two bargainers is βRWK. We denote the shares of the
surplus going to T and to WK by (δ1, 1− δ1) respectively.
These shares are the optimal solutions of the following Nash bargaining problem
between MT and WK at t = 1:
max
δ1
[β(1− δ1)RWK][δ1βRWK − (βb
H
0 −B)] (1)
The solution of (1) is:
δ∗1 =
1
2
+
bH0
2RWK
−
B
2βRWK
(2)
and hence the minimum bid of WK accepted by I is b1 ≥ δ
∗
1RWK.
This provides us a first boundary on the white knight bid:
b1 ≥ δ
∗
1RWK (3)
provided that bWK1 is not larger than the white knight value RWK, which, as before,
requires that δ∗1 < 1. This is in turn equivalent to:
bH0
2RWK
−
B
2βRWK
<
1
2
RWK > b
H
0 −
B
β
This latter condition is always verified for white knights with valuations RWK ∈
[bH0 , RH [.
We then have to derive the white knight’s optimal bid given the above constraints.
The result is stated in the next proposition.
Proposition 1 Assume the type of WK is RWK ∈ [b
H
0 , RH [. The optimal bid for
WK of type RWK > b
∗
1 is b
∗
1 = max{RH −
B
β
, bH0 + ε, δ
∗
1RWK}, where
δ∗1 =
1
2
+
bH0
2RWK
−
B
2βRWK
and ε > 0 arbitrarily small.
Proof : in the Appendix.
The intuition behind the proof of Proposition 1 is the following: WK can overtake
H with certainty only if her bid bWK1 gives I an outside option high enough to make
impossible forH to find an agreement with I in the next round of bargaining. Formally,
this requires bWK1 to be high enough to make δ2 ≥ 1, where δ2 is the quota of surplus
8
bH0
RH – B / ß
(RWK - B/ß)/2
RH - B/ßRWK - B/ß
bH0
d1RWK
bWK,1
Figure 2:
going to I in a Nash bargaining with H at period two. As in any Nash bargaining
problem, δ2 is increasing in the outside option of WK, which at t = 2 is determined by
the outstanding bid bWK1 offered by WK at t = 1. A higher b
WK
1 makes I tougher in
later negotiations with H, at the limit excluding the possibility of a mutually profitable
agreement.
The table below summarizes the conditions under which WK of type RWK ∈
[b∗1, RH [ wins the takeover auction:
b∗1 ≥ RH −
B
β
to ensure that δ2(b
WK
1 ) ≥ 1
b∗1 > b
H
0 to beat the outstanding bid by H
b∗1 ≥ δ1RWK for I to accept the bid (with δ1 < 1,∀Rwk ≥ b
H
0 )
Figure 2 illustrates the best reply function b∗1(b
H
0 ) in bold.
From the figure, we can clearly see that only the first two conditions matter. This
is also stated in the following Lemma.
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Lemma 2 A white knight of type RWK ≥ b
∗
1 wins the takeover contest at t = 1 with a
bid b∗1 = max{RH −
B
β
, bH0 + ε} ε > 0 arbitrarily small.
Proof: in the Appendix.
Only WK with types RWK ≥ max{RH −
B
β
, bH0 } can profitably enter the takeover
auction. White knights with lower synergies can not win the takeover with positive
profits, hence, by Lemma 1, they stay out of the auction.
A useful way to describe the best reply of WK at t = 1 to bH0 is to introduce the
threshold function t(bH0 ) where t(b
H
0 ) is the highest type of white knight the raider can
eliminate with certainty from the takeover contest given the raider’s initial bid bH0 . This
function t(bH0 ) can be easily derived from Lemma 2 and is formally defined as follows:
Corollary 1 The function t(bH0 ) is defined as
t(bH0 ) =
{
RH −
B
β
for bH0 ≤ RH −
B
β
bH0 for b
H
0 ≥ RH −
B
β
(4)
Thus, any initial premium initially offered by H preempts a white knight with
synergy RWK < RH −
B
β
to enter the takeover contest. For WK with higher types
RWK ≥ RH −
B
β
the strategic interaction between the two contestants is similar to an
ascending auction.
3.2 The hostile initial bid
At time t = 0 the hostile raider H decides whether to open the control contest or not;
if he decides to enter, then he has to choose the first offer b0. His strategy correctly
takes into account the best reply t(b0) of WK contained in (4); in other words, he
rationally anticipates that for any initial bid b0, white knights with type RWK < t(b0)
will stay out of the contest.
Given that RWK is uniformly distributed on the interval [0, RH ], so F (x) =
x
RH
we
can state the raider’s optimization problem at t = 0 as follows13:
max
b0
(1− p)(RH − b0) + p
(
t(b0)
RH
(RH − b0)
)
(5)
s.t. : b0 ≥ δ
∗
0RH
where δ∗0 is the solution of the following Nash bargaining problem:
13When H bids for the stake β of T his expected payoff is equal to
(1− p)β(RH − b0) + p
(
t(b0)
RH
β(RH − b0)
)
which is proportional to a factor β to the one in the text. The solutions of the two problems then
coincide.
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max
δ0
[β(1− δ0)RH ]
1−p
(
1−
t(b0)
RH
)
[βδ0RH −B]
p
(
1−
t(b0)
RH
)
(6)
In other words, (1− p)(RH − b0) is the expected payoff of H if a WK does not step
in in the next round, which occurs with probability p, whereas p
(
t(b0)
RH
(RH − b0)
)
is his
payoff when WK exists but has a synergy RWK ≤ t(b0).
In order to solve problem (5) we first explicitly determine the solution of (6) between
H and I; we then proceed to solve the unconstrained maximization of H’s expected
profit; and finally we check when the constraint b0 ≥ δ
∗
0RH is binding.
The Nash bargaining solution δ∗0 depends crucially on the relative bargaining power
of H and I. Intuitively, the bargaining power of I should increase with the possibility
for I to obtain a better price from a white knight at a later stage. This event occurs
with probability pPr(RWK ≥ t(b0)) = p
(
1− t(b0)
RH
)
. For analytical tractability we
assume that the bargaining power of I is indeed equal to the probability of a successful
ex-post intervention of WK.
The next Proposition contains the key result about the optimal hostile entry bid.
Proposition 2 For B ≥ βRH the control contest is not initiated by H, and I stays in
place. For B ∈
[
βRH
2
, βRH
]
the unique solution of (5) is b∗0 = δ0RH where δ0 ∈]
B
βRH
, 1[
solves:
1 + β
(1− δ0)RH
δ0βRH −B
+ log
(
β (1− δ0)RH
δ0βRH −B
)
=
1
p(1− δ0)
For B
[
2 + p
(
1− B
βRH
)]
< βRH (⇒ 2B < βRH) then the unique solution of (5) is
b∗0 = δ0RH where
δ0 =
B
βRH
[
1 + p
(
1−
B
βRH
)]
< 1
Proof: The proof is done in several steps.
We start by noticing that the function t(b0) is not differentiable at b0 = RH −
B
β
:
this forces us to solve (6) looking separately at the solutions in two intervals: first look
for solutions b0 ≤ RH −
B
β
, and then for solutions in the range b0 ≥ RH −
B
β
.
Lemma 3 For B
[
2 + p
(
1− B
βRH
)]
< βRH (⇒ 2B < βRH) then the unique solution
of (5) is b∗0 = δ0RH where
δ0 =
B
βRH
[
1 + p
(
1−
B
βRH
)]
< 1
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Proof: We constrain ourselves to the range of b0 ≤ RH−
B
β
, where t(b0) = RH−
B
β
.
Substituting for t(b0) in the Nash bargaining problem and taking logs we obtain:
max
δ0
(
1− p
(
1−
RH −
B
β
RH
))
log (β(1− δ0)RH) + p
(
1−
RH −
B
β
RH
)
log (βδ0RH −B)
max
δ0
(
1− p
B
βRH
)
log (β(1− δ0)RH) + p
(
B
βRH
)
log (βδ0RH −B)
whose f.o.c. is:
pB
βδ0RH −B
=
1− p B
βRH
1− δ0
δ0 =
B
βRH
(
1 + p− p
B
βRH
)
Since at this point b0 = δ0RH , this solution is consistent to our initial requirement
b0 ≤ RH −
B
β
iff
B
βRH
(
1 + p− p
B
βRH
)
≤ 1−
B
βRH
which can be rewritten as B
βRH
[
2 + p
(
1− B
βRH
)]
≤ 1. Notice that a necessary condi-
tion for the last inequality to be satisfied is B
βRH
< 1/2.Notice also that if B
βRH
[
2 + p
(
1− B
βRH
)]
≤
1 then for sure B
βRH
[
1 + p
(
1− B
βRH
)]
= δ0 < 1.
We now proceed studying the expected profit for H, in the range of bids b0 ∈
[0, RH −
B
β
]. Substituting t(b0) = RH −
B
β
into (1 − p)(RH − b0) + p
(
t(b0)
RH
(RH − b0)
)
we obtain
E[ΠH,0(b0)] = (1− p)(RH − b0) + p
(
RH −
B
β
RH
(RH − b0)
)
which is clearly monotone decreasing in b0 in the interval [0, RH −
B
β
]. The constraint
b0 ≥ δ0RH is then binding.
We now turn to solutions in the range b0 ≥ RH −
B
β
, where t(b0) = b0.
Lemma 4 For B ∈]βR
2
, βRH ] the unique solution of (5) is b
∗
0 = δ0RH where δ0 ∈
] B
βRH
, 1[ solves:
1 + β
(1− δ0)RH
δ0βRH −B
+ log
(
β (1− δ0)RH
δ0βRH −B
)
=
1
p(1− δ0)
Proof: Substituting for t(b0) = b0 in the Nash bargaining problem and taking logs
we obtain:
max
δ0
(1− p (1− δ0)) log (β(1− δ0)RH) + p (1− δ0) log (βδ0RH −B)
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and the f.o.c.:
p log (β(1− δ0)RH)−
1−p(1−δ0)
(1−δ0)
−p log (βδ0RH −B) +
p(1−δ0)βRH
βδ0RH−B
= 0
log (β(1− δ0)RH)− log (βδ0RH −B) =
1−p(1−δ0)
p(1−δ0)
− (1−δ0)βRH
βδ0RH−B
log
(
β(1−δ0)RH
βδ0RH−B
)
= 1
p(1−δ0)
− 1− β (1−δ0)RH
βδ0RH−B
1 + β (1−δ0)RH
δ0βRH−B
+ log
(
β(1−δ0)RH
δ0βRH−B
)
= 1
p(1−δ0)
(7a)
Notice that the log functions are defined only for δ0 ∈]
B
βRH
, 1[: if one solution of the
Nash bargaining problem exists, it lies in such an interval. Of course the interval
] B
βRH
, 1[ is non empty only if B < βRH .
Equation (7a) cannot be solved analytically, but one can show that there exists
always a unique solution of (7a) in ] B
βRH
, 1[. Indeed:
lim
δ0→1−
1 + β
(1− δ0)RH
δ0βRH −B
+ log
(
β (1− δ0)RH
δ0βRRH −B
)
= 0
lim
δ0→1−
1
p(1− δ0)
= +∞
lim
δ0→
(
B
βRH
)+1 + β
(1− δ0)RRH
δ0βRRH −B
+ log
(
β (1− δ0)RH
δ0βRRH −B
)
= +∞
lim
δ0→
(
B
βRRH
)+
1
p(1− δ0)
=
1
p(1− B
βRH
)
> 0
and since both functions 1 + β (1−δ0)RH
δ0βRH−B
+ log
(
β(1−δ0)RH
δ0βRH−B
)
and 1
p(1−δ0)
are continuous
in ] B
βRRH
, 1[ they will certainly cross at some point δ0 interior to that interval. Notice
that the solution to the f.o.c. (7a) will be then strictly higher than B
βRH
.
Of course we are left to check when such a solution is consistent, that is when
δ0RH ≥ RH −
B
β
: since δ0 is strictly higher than
B
βRH
a necessary condition for this is
that
B
β
> RH −
B
β
⇔ B >
βRH
2
If we study the expected profit functionE[ΠH,0(b0)] = (1−p)(RH−b0)+p
(
t(b0)
R
(RH − b0)
)
when t(b0) = b0 we obtain:
E[ΠH,0(b0)] = (RH − b0)
(
1− p + p
b0
RH
)
which has a maximum at b0 = RH
(
1− 1
2p
)
. For B > βRH
2
we have that RH
(
1− 1
2p
)
>
RH −
B
β
, so such a maximum falls indeed in the region of bids with t(b0) = b0, and is
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then consistent with our starting point. However, for B > βRH
2
: RH
(
1− 1
2p
)
< B
β
, so
the unconstrained optimal bid for H is lower than δ0RH : the constraint imposed by
the Nash bargaining solution is again binding, and b∗0 = δ0RH , where δ0 solves (7a).
To conclude the proof of the proposition, we finally observe that for B ≥ βRH the
expected profit E[ΠH,0(b0)] < 0 for any positive bid b0 ≥ 0, hence H does not initiate
the control contest.
Proposition 2 above fully characterizes the behavior of raider H. First of all, high
private benefits of control B coupled with low blocks β owned by I offer a strong
anti-takeover device, as in Harris (1990): only when B < βRH there is room for H to
profitably make a first, unsolicited bid.
The relative dimension of private benefits B versus the incumbent’s stake β deter-
mines the level of the bids. When B
β
is relatively high (i.e. it belongs to
[
RH
2
, RH
]
),
the first bid b∗0 is such that more than half of the synergies are appropriated by I.
Moreover, if a subsequent bid by a white knight arises, this is only slightly higher
than b∗0. The incumbent I is very tough in the bargaining with H and manages to
extract most of the surplus; H does not offer more than it is needed to let I agree to
the deal since such a high offer is enough to scare off most of the (potential) white
knights. On the contrary, when B
β
is relatively low (i.e. less than RH
2
), less than half
of the synergies is appropriated by I. Also in this case H does not make high pre-
emptive offers to stop the potential subsequent intervention of a white knight. This
happens because the probability p of white knight intervention is sufficiently low, i.e.
B
[
2 + p
(
1− B
βRH
)]
< βRH ⇔ p <
βRH
B
−2
1− B
βRH
, and for H is optimal to take the chance
of making a low offer and waiting whether ex-post a WK with high synergies arise.
Proposition 2 also highlights that the opening bid by H is a function of the three
main parameters of the model the size of the private benefit of controlB, the probability
to that a white knight exists and steps in p; and the stake of the leading blockholder,
β. It is thus interesting to study how the opening bid changes as these parameters
change. The results of the comparative statics are collected in the next proposition.
Proposition 3 The takeover premium offered by H increases with p, B and decreases
with β.
Proof: in the Appendix.
These results are consistent with the standard predictions of bargaining theory that
in our case explain the level of the first bid.
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4 Empirical Implications
Although the empirical literature on mergers and acquisition is quite vast,14 there
exist few studies that look specifically at the long-term performance of white knights’
acquisitions (Niden (1993), Carroll et at. (1999)), and the results seem not to be
conclusive15.
The results obtained in the previous section provide some testable empirical impli-
cations that should contribute to better understand the features of takeover contest
where there is a white knight intervention..In what follows, we list the main ones by
linking them to the corresponding theoretical results in the previous analysis.
From proposition 2, we know that for B > βRH there is no hostile bid.
Prediction 1: High private benefits of control by the incumbent and low inside
ownership cause less hostile takeover threats.
From Proposition 3, we know that if there is a hostile bid, the entry hostile bid is
equal to b∗0 = δ0RH < RH −
B
β
.
Prediction 2: The hostile bid b∗0, if it is observed, is increasing in δ0, that is it is
increasing in the private benefit of control B and the probability of a white
knight intervention p; it is instead decreasing in the incumbent ownership β.
Testing this prediction would require to build some proxy for the ex-ante prob-
ability of a white knight intervention. One possible way to measure p could be to
use some measures of business proximity between the target firm and other firms, e.g.
board interlocks or other top-management links, cross-holding or other ownership links,
existence of business alliances/partnerships/joint ventures with other firms.
Casual observation seems to document that the intervention of a white knight in-
creases the initial bid and thus the takeover premium for the target firm as shown in
the next table16:
TARGET HOSTILE BIDDER WHITE KNIGHT INITIAL BID FINAL BID
Schering Merck Bayer €77bn €86bn
Arcelor Mittal Severstal €28.2bn €52.5bn
Dofasco Arcelor Thyssen-Krupp CAN$56bn CAN$71
BAA Ferrovial Goldman Sachs £8.1bn £9.5bn
Mannesmann Vodafone Vivendi* 43.7 (shares) 58.98(shares)
Aventis Sanofi Novartis* 47.8bn EUR 54.5bn EUR
14See for instance Burkart and Panunzi (2008) for a review and Martynova and Renneboog (2006)
for a review of the literature on European mergers.
15Andrade et al. (2001) question the methodology used in many long-term event studies, and report
that overall long-term abnormal returns for acquiring are considerably close to zero.
16Based on Kastle and Traepphel (2006).
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Proposition 1, together with Lemma 2 also prove that if a white knight enters the
takeover contest, she offers a bid b∗1 = max{δ0RH , RH −
B
β
}. As already explained,
only white knights with synergies above b∗1 can thus profitably enter the contest. The
higher the price b∗1, the lower the probability (ex-ante) to observe a friendly bid. Hence
we can formulate these two additional testable implication is:
Prediction 3: The higher b∗0, i.e. the initial hostile bid, the lower the probability to
observe WK’s interventions.
Prediction 4: The higher b∗0, the higher should be the white knight synergy when WK
wins the contest. This in turn implies that the ex-post performance of the firms
merged with a WK following a high first hostile bid should be higher than the
ex-post performance of firms merged with a WK who defeated a very low hostile
bid.
Finally, our results suggest that the potential intervention of a white knight may
discourage an initial hostile offer. Since white knights are among the very few remaining
legal anti-takeover measures in Europe, while this is not the case in the US, our paper
provides a possible explanation of why hostile bids may be so rare in Europe.
5 Allowing side payments between the target and
the white knight
We discuss here the consequences of allowing monetary transfers between T and WK
in two different cases: the first is the existence of "crown jewels" (i.e. ex-post transfers
from T to WK); the second is the possibility of ex-ante side payments from T to WK.
Intuitively, suppose T and WK agree that if WK takes over, she receives a strictly
positive payment (e.g. in the form of "crown jewels"). This would increase the ex-ante
value of T for WK up to R′WK; however, as long as R
′
WK ≤ RH with probability
one, and such an agreement is anticipated correctly by H, the solution of the takeover
contest remains the same as in section 3, simply with a new distribution F ′ of R′WK.
The second extension introduces a form of collusion between T and WK. Let us
allow now side payments from T to WK of the following form: T agrees to subsidize
the cost of making a bid to WK, even if it is commonly known that WK will loose
the auction. In such a case Lemma 1 does not hold anymore and WK can bid up to
RWK even if she knows she is going to loose the auction for sure. This may change the
whole equilibrium of the game.
Proceed again by backward induction; take any type RWK < RH −
B
β
, and sup-
pose the outstanding bid bH0 ∈]0, RWK [. Such a WK knows she will loose for sure
the takeover contest, and according to Lemma 1, she would stay out of the auction.
However, in exchange for a payment conditional on WK making a bid, WK now offers
up to bWK1 = RWK. The best reply of WK to b
H
0 at t = 1 is then b
WK
1 = RWK , ∀RWK.
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This implies that now the function t(bH0 ) becomes to t(b
H
0 ) = b
H
0 . Let us then go
back to (5); substituting for t(bH0 ) = b
H
0 we obtain the optimal (unconstrained) bid
bH0 =
(
1−
1
2p
)
RH (8a)
while (6) still defines the Nash bargaining problem between H and I. The solution δ0
of (6) is provided implicitly in Lemma 3, and is certainly lying in the interval ] B
βRH
, 1[.
When
(
1− 1
2p
)
< B
βRH
the first bid of H is equal to δ0RH for sure (as in the case
without side payments). On the contrary, with high p :
(
1− 1
2p
)
> B
βRH
the hostile bid
is bH0 = max
{(
1− 1
2p
)
RH , δ0RH
}
, where δ0 is the solution of (6). H is then pushed
to offer in the first period a weakly higher bid compared to the case with no collusion.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we study takeover contests where an hostile raider, who initiate the
takeover, compete against white knights involved by the target management. At each
stage of the price negotiation we assume that the target management has the power to
bargain with the potential bidders to set a minimum to the takeover price.
We find that the combination of these two anti-takeover devices - white knight
intervention and managerial control over the bargaining process - may allow a white
knight with synergies with the target firm lower than those of the hostile raider to
actually win the takeover contest.
We design a takeover contest as a particular English auction where the bids at each
round are negotiated by the target management with each of the bidders alternatively.
While the idea of modeling the interaction between the target management and the
bidder has been previously employed by Harris (1990), we are the first ones, to our
knowledge, to combine the bargaining process with an English auction where the raider
and the white knight compete one against the other for the control of the target com-
pany. Using this innovative framework we are able to characterize the conditions under
which the possibility of a subsequent white knight intervention is sufficient to prevent
a hostile bid. Moreover, we show that high initial unsolicited offers signals relatively
low synergies by the raider who launched them.
The results of our basic model are robust if we consider an extension of the model
allowing for collusion (ex-ante and ex-post) between the target firm and the white
knight.
Finally, this paper sheds light on the mechanism leading to the determination of
takeover bids and it helps to explain why only a few hostile bids occur (or win) when
it is commonly believed that a firm can be protected by white knights. In this respect,
the present paper contributes then to the current regulatory debate on the optimal
design of anti-takeover devices.
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8 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: We already know the minimum bid the white knight has
to offer for I to be willing to consider it. Assume for the moment that any WK with
RWK ∈ [b
H
0 , RH [ is sure to win the takeover auction if she overbids H. In such a case
b1 must solve:
max
b1
β(RWK − b1) Pr(WK wins at bid b1)
max
b1
β(RWK − b1)
whose solution is clearly the minimum bid b1 that guarantees that Pr(WK wins at bid
b) = 1. But in order to have Pr(WK wins at bid b) = 1, it must be that in the next
round of bids, the hostile bidder will not be able to beat the outstanding bid b1, i.e. he
will not be able to counterbid. This is true if and only if in t = 2, δ2(bWK1) ≥ 1, that
is if and only if the minimum acceptable bid requested by the target management in
the next period is larger than the synergy RH..
Formally, this is equivalent to the following condition on the white knight’s winning
bid
b1 : δ2(b1) ≥ 1
Last, the bid b1 must also be higher than the outstanding hostile bid b
H
0 :
b1 > b
H
0 (9)
To derive the minimum b1 such that δ2(b1) ≥ 1, we need to look at what would
happen in the next bargaining round between the target management and the hostile
bidder.
The Nash bargaining problem will look like17:
max
δ2
[β(1− δ2)RH ][δ2βRH −B − (βb1)]
so that
δ2(b1) =
1
2
+
b1
2RH
+
B
2βRH
17If I concludes the sale of T with H at t = 2, he obtains the quota βδ2 of the total synergy RH,
but he loses his control of T, hence the private benefits B.
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and finally
δ2(b1) ≥ 1
⇔ b1 ≥ RH −
B
β
(10)
Notice that δ2(b1) is increasing in the bid b1 hence any bid higher than RH −
B
β
deters H from overbidding at t = 2. Thus RH −
B
β
is the minimum bid that the white
knight will need to offer in t = 1 to ensure that his opponent H cannot profitably
overbid in the subsequent round.
Notice also that since b1 is independent of b
H
0 , we do not need the exact expression
of bH0 to compute δ2(b1).
In conclusion, for the optimal WK’s bid b̂1 to ensure that the white knight wins the
takeover contest at t = 1, all the three conditions (3), (9) and (10), must be met. 
Proof of Lemma 2: Putting together (3), (9) and (10) derived above it is clear
that for the white knight to beat the raider and to take over T it must be that b∗1 =
max{RH −
B
β
, bH0 , δ1RWK}.
Computing the function δ1RWK =
RWK
2
+
bH0
2
− B
2β
at bH0 = 0 gives us the intercept
of δ1RWK, and is then easy to see (fig. 2) that the lines b
∗
1 = δ1RWK and b
∗
1 = b
H
0 cross
at a point below RH −
B
β
. Indeed, 1
2
+ b
2RWK
− B
2βRWK
= b for b = RWK −
B
β
≤ RH −
B
β
,
by RWK ≤ RH . Hence δ1RWK is always lower than max{RH −
B
β
, bH0 }. 
Proof of Proposition 3: First, notice that for any triple of (B, p, β), b∗0 = δ0RH ,
so that the comparative statics on b∗0 coincide with the ones of δ0. We start studying
the case B < 2βR, when δ0 =
B
βRH
[
1 + p
(
1− B
βRH
)]
. It is immediate then to verify
that:
∂δ0
∂p
> 0
∂δ0
∂B
> 0
∂δ0
∂β
< 0
For B ∈
[
βRH
2
, βRH
]
the quota δ0 ∈]
B
βRH
, 1[ is implicitly defined by equation:
1 + β
(1− δ0)RH
δ0βRH −B
+ log
(
(1− δ0)RH
δ0βRRH −B
)
=
1
p(1− δ0)
For easiness of notation, define (1−δ0)RH
δ0βRH−B
≡ X(β,B, δ0). By the implicit function theo-
rem we obtain:
∂δ0
∂B
= −
(
1
X
+ β
)
∂X
∂B(
1
X
∂X
∂δ0
+ β ∂X
∂δ0
−
∂
(
1
p(1−δ0)
)
∂δ0
)
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where the denominator is negative since it is equal to the s.o.c. of the Nash bargaining
problem. Hence,
sgn
(
∂δ0
∂B
)
= sgn
(
1
X
+ β
)
∂X
∂B
> 0
Analogously,
∂δ0
∂β
= −
(
1
X
+ β
)
∂X
∂β
+X(
1
X
∂X
∂δ0
+ β ∂X
∂δ0
−
∂
(
1
p(1−δ0)
)
∂δ0
)
⇒ sgn
(
∂δ0
∂B
)
= sgn
((
1
X
+ β
)
∂X
∂β
+X
)
and explicitly computing(
1
X
+ β
)
∂X
∂β
+X =
−δ0 (1− δ0)R
2
H
(δ0βRH −B)
2
(
1
X
+ β
)
+
(1− δ0)RH
δ0βRH −B
=
(1− δ0)RH
δ0βRH −B
(
1−
δ0RH
δ0βRH −B
(
1
X
+ β
))
=
(1− δ0)RH
δ0βRH −B
(
1−
δ0RH
δ0βRH −B
(
δ0βRH −B
(1− δ0)RH
+ β
))
=
(1− δ0)RH
δ0βRH −B
(
1−
δ0RH
(1− δ0)RH
−
βδ0RH
δ0βRH −B
)
< 0
since βδ0RH
δ0βRH−B
> 1 and (1−δ0)RH
δ0βRH−B
> 0. Thus ∂δ0
∂β
< 0.
Finally:
∂δ0
∂p
=
∂
(
1
p(1−δ0)
)
∂p(
1
X
∂X
∂δ0
+ β ∂X
∂δ0
−
∂
(
1
p(1−δ0)
)
∂δ0
)
⇒ sgn
(
∂δ0
∂p
)
= sgn
∂
(
− 1
p(1−δ0)
)
∂p
 > 0
that concludes our proof.
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